Chinese state-linked hackers reportedly sat inside the private phones of Downing Street insiders for years—right as Britain’s new leadership moves to warm up relations with Beijing.
Story Snapshot
- A Telegraph investigation says China-linked “Salt Typhoon” hackers compromised phones used by senior aides to multiple UK prime ministers from 2021 to 2024.
- Reports say the intrusion could have exposed calls, texts, metadata, and geolocation data—intelligence gold even without “reading every message.”
- MI5 previously warned Parliament about China-related espionage threats, and US intelligence sources reportedly believe the operation may still be active.
- The revelations land as Prime Minister Keir Starmer prepares a China trip and as the UK advances plans tied to a major Chinese embassy project in London.
What the UK Phone-Hacking Reports Claim—and Why Metadata Matters
Multiple outlets, led by a UK newspaper investigation, report that Chinese state-sponsored hackers tied to the “Salt Typhoon” operation infiltrated mobile phones used by senior aides to Prime Ministers Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, and Rishi Sunak between 2021 and 2024. The reporting describes access that may have included calls, texts, metadata, and location information. Even when message content is uncertain, metadata can map relationships, routines, and sensitive government decision-making patterns.
Several key details remain unresolved in public reporting. Sources describe the breach as deep and sustained, but the exact scope of what was extracted—full message content versus metadata—has not been fully documented for the public. Some reporting also suggests uncertainty about whether the prime ministers’ own devices were affected, as opposed to the phones of close aides. Those limitations matter because they determine both the immediate counterintelligence risk and the scale of any necessary remediation.
Salt Typhoon’s Track Record: Telecom Intrusions and “Record Calls at Will” Fears
Salt Typhoon is widely described as a China-linked cyber actor known for compromising telecommunications infrastructure, which can provide quiet, persistent access to communications. One cited US national security figure warned that, under the right conditions, telecom-level access could enable adversaries to record calls. That concern is not theoretical: telecom compromises can allow surveillance without needing to “hack” each individual app, turning entire networks into collection platforms for state intelligence.
Reporting also places the Downing Street phone targeting in a wider pattern of China-related cyber activity affecting Western governments and critical infrastructure. Cybersecurity coverage referenced additional China-linked activity impacting UK systems in 2023–2024 and described another Chinese group accessing UK Foreign Office servers in a more recent incident. Taken together, the picture presented is of persistent probing for weak points—especially where government operations rely on commercial networks and mobile devices that are hard to lock down.
Starmer’s Beijing Outreach Collides With a Security Reality Check
The timing is politically explosive. The reports broke as Prime Minister Keir Starmer prepared a China trip framed around trade and engagement, a shift from the more openly confrontational posture seen at points under Conservative leadership. Separately, reporting highlighted controversy over UK approvals tied to a major Chinese “mega-embassy” plan in London, including concerns about proximity to sensitive communications infrastructure. Downing Street was reportedly contacted for comment in at least one account, with no reply noted.
China has rejected similar hacking allegations in the past as lacking evidence or being “baseless,” and no detailed public rebuttal addressing the specific claims has been widely reported alongside the latest disclosures. That leaves the UK facing a familiar dilemma: pursue economic engagement while absorbing an intelligence and security threat picture that allied services have repeatedly warned is ongoing. For ordinary citizens, it is a reminder that “global business as usual” can carry hidden costs when adversaries treat openness as an opportunity.
What This Signals for the US and Allies in 2026
For Americans watching from the outside, the UK story reads like a cautionary tale for any nation that relies on sprawling telecom ecosystems while adversarial states play the long game. US intelligence reportedly helped attribute the UK targeting to Salt Typhoon and suggested the operation could still be active, raising the prospect that even new teams can inherit compromised communications environments. That reality strengthens the argument for hardened government comms, clearer red lines, and consequences that go beyond statements.
New: China Hacks UK Aides' Phones As Starmer Cozies Up to Beijing https://t.co/k9E0Z5032t
— Pog (@OSINT220) January 27, 2026
The public record still lacks granular technical disclosure, so readers should separate confirmed timelines and attribution claims from unanswered questions about what data was actually taken. But the strategic lesson is straightforward: if a foreign power can quietly harvest who talks to whom, when, and where, it can pressure officials, anticipate negotiations, and shape outcomes without firing a shot. In constitutional republics, defending sovereignty starts with defending communications.
Sources:
https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/salt-typhoon-hacked-phones-british-prime-ministers/
https://www.cityam.com/starmer-under-fire-over-china-trip-amid-phone-hacking-revelations/
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/01/26/china-hacked-downing-street-phones-for-years/





